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Abstract. The economics of information security has recently become a
thriving and fast-moving discipline. As distributed systems are assembled
from machines belonging to principals with divergent interests, incentives
are becoming as important to dependability as technical design. The
new field provides valuable insights not just into ‘security’ topics such as
privacy, bugs, spam, and phishing, but into more general areas such as
system dependability (the design of peer-to-peer systems and the optimal
balance of effort by programmers and testers), and policy (particularly
digital rights management). This research program has been starting to
spill over into more general security questions (such as law-enforcement
strategy), and into the interface between security and sociology. Most
recently it has started to interact with psychology, both through the
psychology-and-economics tradition and in response to phishing. The
promise of this research program is a novel framework for analyzing
information security problems – one that is both principled and effective.
1 Introduction
Over the last few years, people have realised that security failure is caused by
bad incentives at least as often as by bad design. Systems are particularly prone
to failure when the person guarding them does not suffer the full cost of failure.
Game theory and microeconomic theory are becoming important to the security
engineer, just as as the mathematics of cryptography did a quarter century
ago. The growing use of security mechanisms for purposes such as digital rights
management and accessory control – which exert power over system owners
rather than protecting them from outside enemies – introduces many strategic
issues. Where the system owner’s interests conflict with those of her machine’s
designer, economic analysis can shine light on policy options.
We survey recent results and live research challenges in the economics of infor-
mation security. Our goal is to present several promising applications of economic
theory and ideas to practical information security problems. In Section 2, we con-
sider foundational concepts: misaligned incentives in the design and deployment
of computer systems, and the impact of externalities. Section 3 discusses in-
formation security applications where economic analysis has yielded interesting
insights: software vulnerabilities, privacy, and the development of user-control
mechanisms to support new business models. Metrics present another challenge:
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risks cannot be managed better until they can be measured better. Most users
cannot tell good security from bad, so developers are not compensated for efforts
to strengthen their code. Some evaluation schemes are so badly managed that
‘approved’ products are less secure than random ones. Insurance is also problem-
atic; the local and global correlations exhibited by different attack types largely
determine what sort of insurance markets are feasible. Cyber-risk markets are
thus generally uncompetitive, underdeveloped or specialised.
Economic factors also explain many challenges to privacy. Price discrimina-
tion – which is economically efficient but socially controversial – is simultaneously
made more attractive to merchants, and easier to implement, by technological
advance. Privacy problems also create many externalities. For example, spam and
‘identity theft’ impose non-negligible social costs. Information security mecha-
nisms or failures can also create, destroy or distort other markets: digital rights
management in online music and software markets provides a topical example.
Finally, we look at government policy options for dealing with market failures
in Section 4, where we examine regulation and mechanism design.
We conclude by discussing several open research challenges: examining the
security impact of network structure on interactions, reliability and robustness.
2 Foundational Concepts
Economic thinkers used to be keenly aware of the interaction between economics
and security; wealthy nations could afford large armies and navies. But nowadays
a web search on ‘economics’ and ‘security’ turns up relatively few articles. The
main reason is that, after 1945, economists drifted apart from people working
on strategic studies; nuclear weapons were thought to decouple national survival
from economic power [1], and a secondary factor may have been that the USA
confronted the USSR over security, but Japan and the EU over trade. It has
been left to the information security world to re-establish the connection.
2.1 Misaligned incentives
One of the observations that sparked interest in information security economics
came from banking. In the USA, banks are generally liable for the costs of card
fraud; when a customer disputes a transaction, the bank must either show she is
trying to cheat it, or refund her money. In the UK, the banks had a much easier
ride: they generally got away with claiming that their systems were ‘secure’, and
telling customers who complained that they must be mistaken or lying. “Lucky
bankers,” one might think; yet UK banks spent more on security and suffered
more fraud. This may have been what economists call a moral-hazard effect: UK
bank staff knew that customer complaints would not be taken seriously, so they
became lazy and careless, leading to an epidemic of fraud [2].
In 1997, Ayres and Levitt analysed the Lojack car-theft prevention system
and found that once a threshold of car owners in a city had installed it, auto theft
plummeted, as the stolen car trade became too hazardous [3]. This is a classic
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example of an externality, a side-effect of an economic transaction that may have
positive or negative effects on third parties. Camp and Wolfram built on this in
2000 to analyze information security vulnerabilities as negative externalities, like
air pollution: someone who connects an insecure PC to the Internet does not face
the full economic costs of that, any more than someone burning a coal fire. They
proposed trading vulnerability credits in the same way as carbon credits [4].
Also in 2000, Varian looked at the anti-virus software market. People did not
spend as much on protecting their computers as they logically should have. At
that time, a typical virus payload was a service-denial attack against the website
of Amazon or Microsoft. While a rational consumer might well spend $20 to stop
a virus trashing her hard disk, she will be less likely to do so just to protect a
wealthy corporation [5].
Legal theorists have long known that liability should be assigned to the party
that can best manage the risk. Yet everywhere we look, we see online risks allo-
cated poorly, resulting in privacy failures and protracted regulatory tussles. For
instance, medical record systems are bought by hospital directors and insurance
companies, whose interests in account management, cost control and research
are not well aligned with the patients’ interests in privacy; this mismatch of
incentives led in the USA to HIPAA, a law that sets standards for privacy in
health IT. Bohm et al. [6] documented how many banks used online banking
as a means of dumping on their customers many of the transaction risks that
they previously bore in the days of cheque-based banking; for a recent update
on liability in payment systems, see [7].
Asymmetric information plays a large role in information security. Moore
showed that we can classify many problems as hidden-information or hidden-
action problems [8]. The classic case of hidden information is the ‘market for
lemons’ [26]. Akerlof won a Nobel prize for the following simple yet profound in-
sight: suppose that there are 100 used cars for sale in a town: 50 well-maintained
cars worth $2000 each, and 50 ‘lemons’ worth $1000. The sellers know which
is which, but the buyers don’t. What is the market price of a used car? You
might think $1500; but at that price no good cars will be offered for sale. So the
market price will be close to $1000. Hidden information, about product quality,
is one reason poor security products predominate. When users can’t tell good
from bad, they might as well buy a cheap antivirus product for $10 as a better
one for $20, and we may expect a race to the bottom on price.
Hidden-action problems arise when two parties wish to transact, but one
party’s unobservable actions can impact the outcome. The classic example is
insurance, where a policyholder may behave recklessly without the insurance
company observing this. Network nodes can hide malicious or antisocial behav-
ior from their peers; routers can quietly drop selected packets or falsify responses
to routing requests; nodes can redirect network traffic to eavesdrop on conver-
sations; and players in file-sharing systems can hide whether they share with
others, so some may ‘free-ride’ rather than to help sustain the system. Once
the problem is seen in this light, designers can minimise the capacity for hidden
action, or to make it easy to enforce suitable contracts.
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This helps explain the evolution of peer-to-peer systems. Early systems pro-
posed by academics, such as Eternity, Freenet, Chord, Pastry and OceanStore,
required users to serve a random selection of other users’ files [9]. These sys-
tems were never widely adopted. Later systems that did attract large numbers
of users, like Gnutella and Kazaa, instead allow peer nodes to serve only the
content they have downloaded for their own use, rather than burdening them
with others’ files. The comparison between these architectures originally focused
on purely technical aspects: the cost of search, retrieval, communications and
storage. However, analysing incentives turned out to be fruitful too.
First, a system structured as an association of clubs reduces the potential
for hidden action; club members are more able to assess which members are
contributing. Second, clubs might have quite divergent interests. Though peer-
to-peer systems are now seen as mechanisms for sharing music, early systems
were designed for censorship resistance. A system might serve a number of quite
different groups – maybe Chinese dissidents, critics of Scientology, or aficionados
of sado-masochistic imagery that is legal in California but banned in Tennessee.
Early peer-to-peer systems required such users to serve each other’s files, so
that they ended up protecting each others’ free speech. But might such groups
not fight harder to defend their own colleagues, rather than people involved in
struggles in which they have no interest?
Danezis and Anderson introduced the Red-Blue model to analyze this [10].
Each node has a preference among resource types, for instance left-leaning versus
right-leaning political texts, while a censor will try to impose his own preference.
His action will suit some nodes but not others. The model proceeds as a multi-
round game in which nodes set defense budgets that affect the probability that
they will defeat the censor or be overwhelmed by him. Under reasonable as-
sumptions, the authors show that diversity (with each node storing its preferred
resource mix) performs better under attack than solidarity (where each node
stores the same resource mix). Diversity makes nodes willing to allocate higher
defense budgets; the greater the diversity, the more quickly will solidarity crum-
ble in the face of attack. This model was an early venture on the boundary
between economics and sociology; it sheds light on the general problem of di-
versity versus solidarity, which has had a high profile recently because of the
question whether the growing diversity of modern societies is in tension with the
solidarity on which modern welfare systems are founded [11].
2.2 Security as an externality
Information industries have many different types of externality. They tend to
have dominant firms for three reasons. First, there are often network external-
ities, whereby the value of a network grows more than linearly in the number
of users; for example, anyone wanting to auction some goods will usually go to
the largest auction house, as it will attract more bidders. Second, there is often
technical lock-in stemming from interoperability, and markets can be two-sided:
software firms develop for Windows to access more customers, and users buy
Windows machines to get access to more software. Third, information industries
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tend to combine high fixed and low marginal costs: the first copy of a software
program (or a music download ot even a DVD) may cost millions to produce,
while subsequent copies are almost free. These three features separately can lead
to industries with dominant firms; together, they are even more likely to.
This not only helps explain the rise and dominance of operating systems,
from System/360 through DOS and Windows to Symbian; it also helps explain
patterns of security flaws. While a platform vendor is building market dominance,
it has to appeal to vendors of software as well as to users, and security could
get in their way. So vendors start off with minimal protection; once they have
become dominant, they add security to lock their customers in more tightly [12].
We’ll discuss this in more detail later.
Further externalities affect security investment, as protection often depends
on the efforts of many principals. Hirshleifer told the story of Anarchia, an island
whose flood defences were constructed by individual families and whose defence
depends on the weakest link, that is, the laziest family; he compared this with
a city whose defences against ICBM attack depend on the single best defensive
shot [13]. Varian extended this to three cases of interest to the dependability of
information systems – where performance depends on the minimum effort, the
best effort, or the sum-of-efforts [14].
Program correctness can depend on minimum effort (the most careless pro-
grammer introducing a vulnerability) while software vulnerability testing may
depend on the sum of everyone’s efforts. Security may also depend on the best
effort – the actions taken by an individual champion such as a security architect.
When it depends on the sum of individual efforts, the burden will tend to be
shouldered by the agents with the highest benefit-cost ratio, while the others
free-ride. In the minimum-effort case, the agent with the lowest benefit-cost ra-
tio dominates. As more agents are added, systems become more reliable in the
total-effort case but less reliable in the weakest-link case. What are the implica-
tions? Well, software companies should hire more software testers and fewer but
more competent programmers. (Of course, measuring programmer competence
can be hard, which brings us back to hidden information.)
This work inspired other researchers to consider interdependent risk. A re-
cent influential model by Kunreuther and Heal notes that an individual taking
protective measures creates positive externalities for others that in turn may
discourage them from investment [15]. This insight has implications far beyond
information security. The decision by one apartment owner to install a sprinkler
system will decrease his neighbours’ fire risk and make them less likely to do the
same; airlines may decide not to screen luggage transferred from other carriers
who are believed to be careful with security; and people thinking of vaccinating
their children may choose to free-ride off the herd immunity instead. In each
case, several widely varying equilibria are possible, from complete adoption to
total refusal, depending on the levels of coordination between principals.
Katz and Shapiro famously analyzed how network externalities influenced
the adoption of technology: they lead to the classic S-shaped adoption curve in
which slow early adoption gives way to rapid deployment once the number of
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users reaches some critical mass [16]. Network effects can also influence the initial
deployment of security technology, whose benefit may depend on the number of
users who adopt it. The cost may exceed the benefit until a minimum number
adopt; so everyone might wait for others to go first, and the technology never gets
deployed. Recently, Ozment and Schechter have analyzed different approaches
for overcoming such bootstrapping problems [17].
This challenge is particularly topical. A number of core Internet protocols,
such as DNS and routing, are considered insecure. Better protocols exist (e.g.,
DNSSEC, S-BGP); the challenge is to get them adopted. Two widely-deployed
security protocols, SSH and IPsec, both overcame the bootstrapping problem
by providing significant internal benefits to adopting firms, with the result that
they could be adopted one firm at a time, rather than needing everyone to move
at once. The deployment of fax machines was similar: many companies initially
bought fax machines to connect their own offices.
3 Applications
3.1 Economics of vulnerabilities
There has been much debate about ‘open source security’, and more generally
whether actively seeking and disclosing vulnerabilities is socially desirable. An-
derson showed in 2002 that, under standard assumptions of reliability growth,
open systems and proprietary systems are just as secure as each other; opening up
a system helps the attackers and defenders equally [18]. Thus the open-security
question may be an empirical one, turning on the extent to which a given real
system follows the standard model.
Rescorla argued in 2004 that for software with many latent vulnerabilities,
removing one bug makes little difference to the likelihood of an attacker finding
another one later [19]. Since exploits are often based on vulnerabilities inferred
from patches, he argued against disclosure and frequent patching unless the
same vulnerabilities are likely to be rediscovered. This also raised the question
of whether software follows the standard dependability model, of independent
vulnerabilities. Ozment found that for FreeBSD, vulnerabilities are correlated in
that they are likely to be rediscovered [20]. Ozment and Schechter also found
that the rate at which unique vulnerabilities were disclosed for the core and
unchanged FreeBSD operating system has decreased over a six-year period [21].
These findings suggest that vulnerability disclosure can improve system security
over the long term. Vulnerability disclosure also helps motivate vendors to fix
bugs [22]. Arora et al. showed that public disclosure made vendors respond with
fixes more quickly; attacks increased to begin with, but reported vulnerabilities
declined over time [23].
This discussion begs a deeper question: why do so many vulnerabilities exist
in the first place? A useful analogy might come from considering large software
project failures: it has been known for years that perhaps 30% of large develop-
ment projects fail [24], and this figure does not seem to change despite improve-
ments in tools and training: people just built much bigger disasters nowadays
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than they did in the 1970s. This suggests that project failure is not fundamen-
tally about technical risk but about the surrounding socio-economic factors (a
point to which we will return later). Similarly, when considering security, soft-
ware writers have better tools and training than ten years ago, and are capable
of creating more secure software, yet the economics of the software industry
provide them with little incentive to do so.
In many markets, the attitude of ‘ship it Tuesday and get it right by ver-
sion 3’ is perfectly rational behaviour. Many software markets have dominant
firms thanks to the combination of high fixed and low marginal costs, network
externalities and client lock-in noted above [25], so winning market races is all-
important. In such races, competitors must appeal to complementers, such as
application developers, for whom security gets in the way; and security tends to
be a lemons market anyway. So platform vendors start off with too little security,
and such as they provide tends to be designed so that the compliance costs are
dumped on the end users [12]. Once a dominant position has been established,
the vendor may add more security than is needed, but engineered in such a way
as to maximise customer lock-in [27].
In some cases, security is even worse than a lemons market: even the vendor
does not know how secure its software is. So buyers have no reason to pay more
for protection, and vendors are disinclined to invest in it.
How can this be tackled? Economics has suggested two novel approaches to
software security metrics: vulnerability markets and insurance.
Vulnerability markets help buyers and sellers establish the actual cost of
finding a vulnerability in software. To begin with, some standards specified a
minimum cost of various kinds of technical compromise; one example is banking
standards for point-of-sale terminals [28]. Camp and Wolfram suggested in 2000
that markets might work better here than central planning [4]. Schechter devel-
oped this into a proposal for open markets in reports of previously undiscovered
vulnerabilities [29]. Two firms, iDefense and Tipping Point, are now openly buy-
ing vulnerabilities, so the market actually exists (unfortunately, the prices are
not published). Their business model is to provide vulnerability data simulta-
neously to their customers and to the affected vendor, so that their customers
can update their firewalls before anyone else. However, the incentives here are
suboptimal: bug-market organisations might increase the value of their product
by leaking vulnerability information to harm non-subscribers [30].
Several variations on vulnerability markets have been proposed. Bo¨hme has
argued that software derivatives might be better [31]. Contracts for software
would be issued in pairs: the first pays a fixed value if no vulnerability is found
in a program by a specific date, and the second pays another value if one is found.
If these contracts can be traded, then their price should reflect the consensus on
software quality. Software vendors, software company investors, and insurance
companies could use such derivatives to hedge risks. A third possibility, due to
Ozment, is to design a vulnerability market as an auction [32].
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One criticism of all market-based approaches is that they might increase the
number of identified vulnerabilities by motivating more people to search flaws.
Thus some care must be exercised in designing them.
An alternative approach is insurance. Underwriters often use expert asses-
sors to look at a client firm’s IT infrastructure and management; this provides
data to both the insured and the insurer. Over the long run, insurers learn to
value risks more accurately. Right now, however, the cyber-insurance market is
both underdeveloped and underutilised. One reason, according to Bo¨hme and
Kataria [33], is the interdependence of risk, which takes both local and global
forms. Firms’ IT infrastructure is connected to other entities – so their efforts
may be undermined by failures elsewhere. Cyber-attacks often exploit a vul-
nerability in a program used by many firms. Interdependence can make some
cyber-risks unattractive to insurers – particularly those risks that are globally
rather than locally correlated, such as worm and virus attacks, and systemic
risks such as Y2K.
Many writers have called for software risks to be transferred to the vendors;
but if this were the law, it is unlikely that Microsoft would be able to buy
insurance. So far, vendors have succeeded in dumping most software risks; but
this outcome is also far from being socially optimal. Even at the level of customer
firms, correlated risk makes firms under-invest in both security technology and
cyber-insurance [34]. Cyber-insurance markets may in any case lack the volume
and liquidity to become efficient.
3.2 Economics of privacy
The persistent erosion of personal privacy has frustrated policy makers and prac-
titioners alike. People say that they value privacy, yet act otherwise. Privacy-
enhancing technologies have been offered for sale, yet most have failed in the
marketplace. Why should this be?
Privacy is one aspect of information security that interested economists be-
fore 2000. In 1978, Posner defined privacy in terms of secrecy [35], and the
following year extended this to seclusion [36]. In 1980, Hirshleifer published a
seminal paper in which he argued that rather than being about withdrawing
from society, privacy was a means of organising society, arising from evolved
territorial behaviour; internalised respect for property is what allows autonomy
to persist in society. These privacy debates in the 1970s led in Europe to generic
data-protection laws, while the USA limited itself to a few sector-specific laws
such as HIPAA. Economists’ appetite for work on privacy was further whetted
recently by the Internet, the dotcom boom, and the exploding trade in personal
information about online shoppers.
An early modern view of privacy can be found in a 1996 paper by Varian
who analysed privacy in terms of information markets [38]. Consumers want to
not be annoyed by irrelevant marketing calls while marketers do not want to
waste effort. Yet both are frustrated, because of search costs, externalities and
other factors. Varian suggested giving consumers rights in information about
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themselves, and letting them lease it to marketers with the proviso that it not
be resold without permission.
The recent proliferation of complex, information-intensive business models
demand a broader approach. Odlyzko argued in 2003 that privacy erosion is a
consequence of the desire to charge different prices for similar services [39]. Tech-
nology is simultaneously increasing both the incentives and the opportunities for
price discrimination. Companies can mine online purchases and interactions for
data revealing individuals’ willingness to pay. From airline yield-management
systems to complex and ever-changing software and telecommunications prices,
differential pricing is economically efficient – but increasingly resented. Acquisti
and Varian analyzed the market conditions under which personalised price dis-
crimination is profitable [40]: it may thrive in industries with wide variation
in consumer valuation for services, where services can be personalised at low
marginal cost, and where repeated purchases are likely.
Acquisti and Grossklags tackled the specific problem of why people express a
high preference for privacy when interviewed but reveal a much lower preference
through their behaviour both online and oﬄine [41]. They find that people mostly
lack sufficient information to make informed choices, and even when they do they
often trade long-term privacy for short-term benefits. Vila et al. characterised
privacy economics as a lemons market [42], arguing that consumers disregard
future price discrimination when giving information to merchants.
Swire argued that we should measure the costs of privacy intrusion more
broadly [43]. If a telesales operator calls 100 prospects, sells three of them insur-
ance, and annoys 80, then the conventional analysis considers only the benefit
to the three and to the insurer. However, persistent annoyance causes millions
of people to go ex-directory, to not answer the phone during dinner, or to screen
calls through an answering machine. The long-run societal harm can be con-
siderable. Several empirical studies have backed this up by examining people’s
privacy valuations.
So much for the factors that make privacy intrusions more likely. What factors
make them less so? Campbell et al. found that the stock price of companies
reporting a security breach is more likely to fall if the breach leaked confidential
information [44]. Acquisti, Friedman and Telang conducted a similar analysis for
privacy breaches [45]. Their initial results are less conclusive but still point to a
negative impact on stock price followed by an eventual recovery.
Regulatory responses (pioneered in Europe) have largely centred on requiring
companies to allow consumers to either ‘opt-in’ or ‘opt-out’ of data collection.
While privacy advocates typically support opt-in policies as they result in lower
rates of data collection, Bouckaert and Degryse argue for opt-out on competition
grounds [46]: the availability of information about the buying habits of most
customers, rather than a few customers, may help competitors to enter a market.
Empirically, there is wide variation in ‘opt-out’ rates between different types
of consumer, but their motives are not always clear. Varian et al. analyzed the
FCC’s telephone-sales blacklist by district [47]. They found that educated people
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are more likely to sign up: but is that because rich households get more calls,
because they value their time more, or because they understand the risks better?
Incentives also affect the design of privacy technology. Builders of anonymity
systems know they depend on network externalities: more users mean more cover
traffic to hide activities from the enemy [48]. An interesting case is Tor [49], which
anonymises web traffic and emphasises usability to increase adoption rates. It
developed from a US Navy communications system, but eventually all internet
users were invited to participate in order to build network size, and it is now the
largest anonymous communication system known.
3.3 Incentives and the deployment of security mechanisms
Insurance is not the only market affected by information security. Some very
high-profile debates have centred on DRM; record companies have pushed for
years for DRM to be incorporated into computers and consumer electronics,
while digital-rights activists have opposed them. What light can security eco-
nomics shed on this debate?
Many researchers have set the debate in a much wider context than just
record companies versus downloaders. Varian pointed out in 2002 that DRM
and similar mechanisms were also about tying, bundling and price discrimina-
tion; and that their unfettered use could damage competition [50]. A paper by
Samuelson and Scotchmer studied what might go wrong if technical and legal
restraints were to undermine the right to reverse engineer software products for
compatibility. It provided the scholarly underpinnings for much of the work on
the anti-competitive effects of the DMCA, copyright control mechanisms, and
information security mechanisms applied to new business models.
‘Trusted Computing’ (TC) mechanisms have come in for significant analy-
sis and criticism. Von Hippel showed how most of the innovations that spur
economic growth are not anticipated by the manufacturers of the platforms on
which they are based; the PC, for example, was conceived as an engine for run-
ning spreadsheets, and if IBM had been able to limit it to doing that, a huge
opportunity would have been lost. Furthermore, technological change in IT mar-
kets is usually cumulative. If security technology can be abused by incumbent
firms to make life harder for innovators, this will create all sorts of traps and per-
verse incentives [52]. Anderson pointed out the potential for competitive abuse
of the TC mechanisms; for example, by transferring control of user data from
the owner of the machine on which it is stored to the creator of the file in which
it is stored, the potential for lock-in is hugely increased [27]. Lookabaugh and
Sicker discussed an existing case history of an industry crippled by security-
related technical lock-in [53]. US cable industry operators are locked in to their
set-top-box vendors; and although they largely negotiated away the direct costs
of this when choosing a suppler, the indirect costs were large and unmanageable.
Innovation suffered and cable fell behind other platforms, such as the Internet,
as the two platform vendors did not individually have the incentive to invest in
improving their platforms.
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Economic research has been applied to the record industry itself, with results
it found disturbing. In 2004, Oberholzer and Strumpf published a now-famous
paper, in which they examined how music downloads and record sales were corre-
lated [54]. They showed that downloads do not do significant harm to the music
industry. Even in the most pessimistic interpretation, five thousand downloads
are needed to displace a single album sale, while high-selling albums actually
benefit from file sharing.
In January 2005, Varian presented a surprising result [55]: that stronger
DRM would help system vendors more than the music industry, because the
computer industry is more concentrated (with only three serious suppliers of
DRM platforms – Microsoft, Sony, and the dominant firm, Apple). The content
industry scoffed, but by the end of that year music publishers were protesting
that Apple was getting too large a share of the cash from online music sales. As
power in the supply chain moved from the music majors to the platform vendors,
so power in the music industry appears to be shifting from the majors to the
independents, just as airline deregulation favoured aircraft makers and low-cost
airlines. This is a striking demonstration of the predictive power of economic
analysis. By fighting a non-existent threat, the record industry had helped the
computer industry forge a weapon that may be its undoing.
3.4 Protecting computer systems from rational adversaries
Information security practitioners traditionally assumed two types of user: hon-
est ones who always behave as directed, and malicious ones intent on wreak-
ing havoc at any cost. But systems are often undermined by what economists
call strategic users: users who act out of self-interest rather than malice. Many
file-sharing systems suffer from ‘free-riding’, where users download files with-
out uploading their own. This is perfectly rational behaviour, given that upload
bandwidth is typically more scarce and file uploaders are at higher risk of getting
sued. The cumulative effect is degraded performance.
Another nuisance caused by selfish users is spam. The cost per transmission
to the spammer is so low that a tiny success rate is acceptable [56]. Further-
more, while spam imposes significant costs on recipients, these costs are not felt
by the spammers. Bo¨hme and Holz examined stock spam and identified statisti-
cally significant increases in the price of touted stocks [57]. Frieder and Zittrain
independently find a similar effect [58].
Several network protocols may be exploited by selfish users at the expense of
system-wide performance. In TCP, the protocol used to transmit most Internet
data, Akella et al. find that selfish provision of congestion control mechanisms
can lead to suboptimal performance [59].
Researchers have used game theory to study the negative effects of selfish be-
haviour on systems more generally. Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou termed the
‘price of anarchy’ as the ratio of the utilities of the worst-case Nash equilibrium
to the social optimum [60]. The price of anarchy has become a standard measure-
ment of the inefficiency of selfish behaviour in computer networks. Roughgarden
and Tardos studied selfish routing in a congested network, comparing congestion
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levels in a network where users choose the shortest path available to congestion
when a network planner chooses paths to maximise flow [61]. They established
an upper bound of 4
3
for the price of anarchy when congestion costs are linear;
furthermore, in general, the total latency of a selfish network is at most the same
as an optimal flow routing twice as much traffic.
Other topics hindered by selfish activity include network creation, where
users decide whether to create costly links to shorten paths or free-ride over
longer, indirect connections [62,63,64]; wireless spectrum sharing, where service
providers compete to acquire channels from access points [65]; and computer
virus inoculation, where users incur a high cost for inoculating themselves and
the benefits accrue to unprotected nodes [66].
To account for user self-interest, computer scientists have proposed several
mechanisms with an informal notion of ‘fairness’ in mind. To address spam,
Dwork and Naor propose attaching to emails a ‘proof-of-work’ that is easy to
do for a few emails but impractical for a flood [67]. Laurie and Clayton criti-
cise ‘proof-of-work’ schemes, demonstrating that the additional burden may be
cumbersome for many legitimate users while spam senders could use botnets
to perform the computations [68]. Furthermore, ISPs may not be prepared to
block traffic from these compromised machines. Serjantov and Clayton analyse
the incentives on ISPs to block traffic from other ISPs with many infected ma-
chines, and back this up with data [69]. They also show how a number of existing
spam-blocking strategies are irrational and counterproductive.
Reputation systems have been widely proposed to overcome free-riding in
peer-to-peer networks. The best-known fielded example may be feedback on
eBay’s online auctions. Dellarocas argues that leniency in the feedback mech-
anism (only 1% of ratings are negative) encourages stability in the market-
place [71]. Serjantov and Anderson use social choice theory to recommend im-
provements to reputation system proposals [72]. Feldman et al model such sys-
tems as an iterated prisoner’s dilemma game, where users in each round alternate
between roles as client and server [70]. Recently, researchers have begun to con-
sider more formally how to construct fair systems using mechanism design. We
discuss these developments in Section 5.1.
4 The Role of Governments
The information security world has been regulated from the beginning, although
initially government concerns had nothing to do with competition policy. The
first driver was a non-proliferation concern. Governments used export licenses
and manipulated research funding to restrict access to cryptography for as long
as possible. This effort was largely abandoned in 2000. The second driver was
the difficulty that even the US government had over many years in procuring
systems for its own use, once information security came to encompass software
security too. Thus, during the 80s and 90s, it was policy to promote research in
security while hindering research in cryptography.
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Landwehr describes the efforts of the US government from the mid-1980s
to tackle a the lemons problem in the security software business [73]. The first
attempted fix was a government evaluation scheme – the Orange Book – but
that brought its own problems. Managers’ desire for the latest software eased
certification requirements: vendors had to simply show that they had initiated
the certification process, which often was never completed. Evaluations were also
conducted at government expense by NSA civil servants, who being risk-averse
took their time; evaluated products were often unusably out of date. There were
also problems interworking with allies’ systems, as countries such as the UK and
Germany had their own incompatible schemes.
This led the NATO governments to establish the ‘Common Criteria’ as a
successor to the Orange Book. Most evaluations are carried out by commercial
laboratories and are paid for by the vendor who is supposed to be motivated by
the cachet of a successful evaluation. The Common Criteria suffer from different
problems, most notably adverse selection: vendors shop around for the evaluator
who will give them the easiest ride, and the national agencies who certify the
evaluation labs are very reluctant to revoke a license, even following scandal,
because of fears that confidence in the scheme will be undermined [74].
Regulation is increasingly justified by perceived market failures in the infor-
mation security industry. The European Union has proposed a Network Security
Policy that sets out a common European response to attacks on information sys-
tems [75]. This starts using economic arguments about market failure to justify
government action in this sector. The proposed solutions are familiar, involving
everything from consciousness raising to more Common Criteria evaluations.
Another explicit use of security economics in policymaking was the Ger-
man government’s comments on Trusted Computing [76]. These set out con-
cerns about issues from certification and trapdoors through data protection to
economic policy matters. They were hugely influential in persuading the Trusted
Computing Group to incorporate and adopt membership rules that mitigated
the risk of its program discriminating against small-to-medium sized enterprises.
Recently the European Commission’s DG Competition has been considering the
economic implications of the security mechanisms of Vista.
Among academic scholars of regulation, Barnes studies the incentives facing
the virus writers, software vendors and computer users [77], and contemplates
various policy initiatives to make computers less liable to infection, from re-
warding those who discover vulnerabilities to penalising users who do not adopt
minimal security standards. Garcia and Horowitz observe that the gap between
the social value of internet service providers, and the revenue at stake associated
with their insecurity, is continuing to increase [78]. If this continues, they argue,
mandatory security standards may become likely.
Moore presents an interesting regulatory question from forensics. While PCs
use standard disc formats, mobile phones use proprietary interfaces, which make
data recovery from handsets difficult; recovery tools exist only for the most
common models. So criminals should buy unfashionable phones, while the police
should push for open standards [79].
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Heavy-handed regulation can introduce high costs – whether directly, or as
a result of agency issues and other secondary factors. Ghose and Rajan discuss
how three US laws – Sarbanes-Oxley, Gramm-Leach-Bliley and HIPAA – place a
disproportionate burden on small and medium sized businesses, largely through a
one-model-fits-all approach to compliance by the big accounting firms [80]. They
show how mandatory investment in security compliance can create unintended
consequences from distorting security markets to reducing competition.
Given the high costs and doubtful effectiveness of regulation, self-regulation
has been tried in a number of contexts, but some attempts failed spectacularly.
For example, a number of organisations have set up certification services to
vouch for the quality of software products or web sites. Their aim was twofold:
to overcome public wariness about electronic commerce, and to forestall more
expensive regulation by the government. But (as with the Common Criteria)
certification markets can easily be ruined by a race to the bottom; dubious
companies are more likely to buy certificates than reputable ones, and even
ordinary companies may shop around for the easiest deal. In the absence of a
capable motivated regulator, ruin can arrive quickly.
Edelman analysed this ‘adverse selection’ in the case of website approvals and
online advertising [81]: while about 3% of websites are malicious, some 8% of
websites with certification from one large vendor are malicious. He also compared
ordinary web search results and those from paid advertising, finding that while
2.73% of companies ranked top in a web search were bad, 4.44% of companies
who had bought ads from the search engine were bad. His conclusion – ‘Don’t
click on ads’ – could be bad news for the search industry.
Self-regulation has fared somewhat better for patch management. Analysis
by Arora et al. shows that competition in software markets hastens patch release
even more than the threat of vulnerability disclosure in two out of three studied
strategies [83]. Beattie et al. found that pioneers who apply patches quickly
end up discovering problems that break their systems, but laggards are more
vulnerable to attack [82].
Governments also facilitate the sharing of security information between pri-
vate companies. Two papers analyse the incentives that firms have to share
information on security breaches within the Information Sharing and Analysis
Centers (ISACs) set up after 9/11 by the US government [84,85]. Theoretical
tools developed to model trade associations and research joint ventures can be
applied to work out optimal membership fees and other incentives.
5 Open Problems
There are many active areas of security-economics research. Here we highlight
just four live problems. Each lies not just at the boundary between security
and economics, but also at the boundary between economics and some other
discipline – respectively algorithmic mechanism design, network science, organ-
isational theory and psychology.
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5.1 Algorithmic Mechanism Design
Given the largely unsatisfactory impact of information security regulation, a
complementary approach based on mechanism design is emerging. Researchers
are beginning to design network protocols and interfaces that are ‘strategy-
proof’: that is, designed so that no-one can gain by cheating [86]. Designing
bad behavior out of systems may be cheaper than policing it afterwards.
One key challenge is to allocate scare digital resources fairly. Nisan and Segal
show that although one can solve the allocation problem using strategy-proof
mechanisms, the number of bits that must be communicated grows exponen-
tially; thus in many cases the best practical mechanism will be a simple bundled
auction [87]. They also suggest that if arbitrary valuations are allowed, players
can submit bids that will cause communications complexity problems for all but
the smallest auctions.
Some promising initial results look at mechanism design and protocols. Feigen-
baum et al. show how combinatorial auction techniques can be used to provide
distributed strategy-proof routing mechanisms [88]. Schneidman et al. compare
the incentive mechanisms in BitTorrent, a popular peer-to-peer file-sharing ap-
plication, to theoretical guarantees of faithfulness [89].
5.2 Network topology and information security
There has been an interesting collaboration recently between physicists and so-
ciologists in analyzing the topology of complex networks and its effect on social
interactions. Computer networks, like social networks, are complex but emerge
from ad-hoc interactions of many entities using simple ground rules. The new dis-
cipline of network analysis takes ideas from sociology, condensed-matter physics
and graph theory, and in turn provides tools for modelling and investigating such
networks (see [90] for a recent survey). Some economists have also recognised the
impact of network structure on a range of activities, from crime [91,92] to the
diffusion of new technologies [93]. Other researchers have focused on why net-
works are formed, where the individual costs of establishing links between agents
is weighed against the overall benefit of improved connectivity [94]. Economic
models are well-suited to comparing the social efficiency of different network
types and predicting which structures are likely to emerge when agents act self-
ishly. See [95] for a collection of recent work.
Network topology can strongly influence conflict dynamics. Often an attacker
tries to disconnect a network or increase its diameter by destroying nodes or
edges, while the defender counters using various resilience mechanisms. Examples
include a music industry body attempting to close down a peer-to-peer file-
sharing network; a police force trying to decapitate a terrorist organisation; and
a totalitarian government harrassing political activists. Police forces have been
curious for some years about whether network science might be of practical use
in covert conflicts – whether to insurgents or to counterinsurgency forces.
Different topologies have different robustness properties. Albert, Jeong and
Baraba´si showed that certain real world networks with scale-free degree distri-
butions resist random attacks much better than targeted attacks [96]. This is
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because scale-free networks – like many real-world networks – get much of their
connectivity from a few nodes with high vertex order. This resilience makes
them highly robust against random upsets; but remove the ‘kingpin’ nodes, and
connectivity collapses.
This is the static case – for example, when a police force becomes aware of a
criminal or terrorist network, and sets out to disrupt it by finding and arresting
its key people. Nagaraja and Anderson extend this to the dynamic case. In
their model, the attacker can remove a certain number of nodes at each round,
after which the defenders recruit other nodes to replace them [97]. They studied
how attack and defence interact using multi-round simulations, and found that
forming localised clique structures at key network points works reasonably well
while defences based on rings did not work well at all. This helps explain why
peer-to-peer systems with ring architectures turned out to be rather fragile –
and why revolutionaries have tended to organise themselves in cells.
An open challenge is how to reconcile the differences between generated net-
work models and computer networks. Degree distribution is only one factor in
the structure of a network. Li et al. closely examined the topology of computer
networks [98] and found that degree-centrality attacks on the Internet do not
work well since edge routers that connect to homes have much higher degree
than backbone routers at major IPSs. For attacks on privacy, however, topolog-
ical analysis has proven quite effective. When Danezis and Wittneben applied
these network analysis ideas to privacy [99], they found that doing traffic anal-
ysis against just a few well-connected organisers can draw a surprising number
of members of a dissident organisation into the surveillance net.
5.3 Large project management
As well as extending into system design, crime, and covert conflict, security
economics may help the student of information systems management. Perhaps
the largest issue here is the risk of large software project failures, which can cost
billions and threaten the survival of organisations.
We noted above that perhaps 30% of large development projects fail [24],
and this figure seems impervious to technological progress: better tools help
engineers make larger systems, the same proportion of which still fail as before.
This suggests that project failure is not technical but down to socio-economic
factors such as the way decisions are taken in firms. There is thus a temptation
to place what we now know about the economics of dependability alongside
institutional economics and perform a gap analysis.
One interesting question is whether public-sector organisations are particu-
larly prone to large software project failure. The CIO of the UK’s Department of
Work and Pensions recently admitted that only 30% of government IT projects
succeed [100]. There are many possible reasons. The dependability literature
teaches that large software project failures are mostly due to overambitious,
vague or changing specifications, coupled with poor communications and an in-
ability to acknowledge the signs of failure early enough to take corrective action.
Good industrial project managers try to close down options fast, and get the
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customer to take the hard decisions upfront. Elected politicians, on the other
hand, are in the business of mediating conflicts between different interests and
groups in society, and as many of these conflicts are transient, avoiding or delay-
ing hard choices is a virtue. Furthermore, at equilibrium, systems have too many
features because the marginal benefit of the typical feature accrues to a small
vocal group, while the cost is distributed across a large user base as a slightly
increased risk of failure. This equilibrium may be even further from the optimum
when design decisions are taken by elected officials: the well-known incentives
to dump liability, to discount consequences that will arrive after the next elec-
tion or reshuﬄe, and to avoid ever admitting error, surely add their share. The
economics of dependability may thus be an interesting topic for researchers in
schools of government.
5.4 Psychology and security
Security engineers have so far had at least three points of contact with psychol-
ogy. First, three famous experiments in social psychology showed the ease with
which people could be bullied by authority figures, or persuaded by peers, to
behave inappropriately. In 1951, Solomon Asch showed that most people could
be induced to deny the evidence of their own eyes in order to conform to a
group [101]; in 1961, Milgram showed that most people would administer severe
electric shocks to an actor playing the role of a ‘learner’ at the behest of an ex-
perimenter playing the role of the ‘teacher’ – even when the ‘learner’ appeared to
be in severe pain and begged the subject to stop [102]; and in 1971, the Stanford
Prisoner Experiment showed that normal people can egg each other on to be-
have wickedly even in the absence of orders. There, students playing the role of
warders so brutalised students playing the role of prisoners that the experiment
had to be stopped [103].
Inappropriate obedience is a live problem: card thieves call up cardholders,
pretend to be from the bank, and demand the PIN [2,74]. Worse, in 1995-2005, a
hoaxer calling himself ‘Officer Scott’ ordered the managers of dozens of US stores
and restaurants to detain some young employee on suspicion of theft and strip-
search her or him. Various other degradations were ordered, including beatings
and sexual assaults. At least 13 people who obeyed the caller and did searches
were charged with crimes, and seven were convicted [104].
The second point of contact has been security usability, which has become
a growth area recently; early results are collected in [105]. The third has been
the study of deception – a somewhat less well-defined field, but which extends
from conjuring to camouflage to the study of fraud, and which is interesting the
security usability community more as phishing becomes a serious problem.
There is a potentially valuable interface with economics here too. Economic
analysis traditionally assumed that the principals are rational and act out of
pure self-interest. Real people depart in a number of ways from this ideal, and
there has arisen in recent years a vigorous school of economic psychology or be-
havioural economics, which studies the effects that human social and cognitive
biases have on economic decision-making. The Nobel prize was recently awarded
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to Kahnemann and Tversky for their seminal role in establishing this field, and
particularly in decision-making under risk and uncertainty. Our mental account-
ing rules are not really rational; for example, most people are disproportionately
reluctant to risk money they already have, and to write off money that they
have wasted.
Schneier has discussed cognitive biases as the root cause of our societies’
vulnerability to terrorism [106]. The psychologist Daniel Gilbert, in an article
provocatively entitled ‘If only gay sex caused global warming’, also discusses
why we are much more afraid of terrorism than of climate change [107]. We have
many built-in biases that made perfect evolutionary sense on the plains of Africa
half a million years ago, but may now be maladaptive. For example, we are more
sensitive to risks involving intentionality, whether of a person or animal, as the
common causes of violent death back then included hungry lions and enemies
with sharp sticks. We are also more afraid of uncertainty; of rare or unfamiliar
risks; of risks controlled by others, particularly ‘outsiders’ or other people we
don’t trust or find morally offensive. A number of these biases tie in with defects
in our mental accounting.
The study of cognitive biases may also help illuminate fraud and phishing.
The fundamental attribution error – that people often err by trying to explain
things by intentionality when their causes are in fact impersonal – undermines
efforts to curb phishing by teaching users about the gory design details of the
Internet – for example, by telling them to parse URLs in emails that seem to
come from a bank. As soon as users get confused, they will revent to judging a
website by its ‘look and feel’.
One potential area of research is gender. Recently people have realised that
software can create barriers to females, and this has led to research work on
‘gender HCI’ – on how software should be designed so that women as well as
men can use it effectively. The psychologist Simon Baron-Cohen classifies human
brains into type S (systematizers) and type E (empathizers) [108]. Type S people
are better at geometry and some kinds of symbolic reasoning, while type Es are
better at language and multiprocessing. Most men are type S, while most women
are type E. Of course, innate abilities can be modulated by many developmental
and social factors. Yet, even at a casual reading, this material raises a suspicion
that many security mechanisms are far from gender-neutral. Is it unlawful sex
discrimination for a bank to expect its customers to detect phishing attacks by
parsing URLs?
Another interesting insight from Baron-Cohen’s work is that humans are
most distinct from other primates in that we have a theory of mind; our brains
are wired so that we can imagine others as being like ourselves, to empathise with
them better. A side-effect is that we are much better at deception. Chimps learn
to ‘hack’ each other, and learn defences against such exploits, more or less at
random; humans can plan and execute complex deceptions. We are also equipped
to detect detection by others, and no doubt our capabilities co-evolved over
many generations of lies, social manipulation, sexual infidelities and revenge. The
hominids who left the most descendants were those who were best at cheating,
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at detecting cheating by others, or both. So we finish this section with the
following provocative thought: if we are really not ‘homo sapiens sapiens’ so
much as ‘homo sapiens deceptor’, then perhaps the design and analysis of system
security mechanisms can be seen as one of the culminations of human intellectual
development.
6 Conclusions
Over the last few years, a research program on the economics of security has
built many cross-disciplinary links and has produced many useful (and indeed
delightful) insights from unexpected places. Many perverse things, long known
to security practitioners but just dismissed as ‘bad weather’, turn out to be quite
explicable in terms of the incentives facing individuals and organisations, and in
terms of different kinds of market failure.
As for the future, the work of the hundred or so researchers active in this field
has started to spill over into at least four new domains. The first is the technical
question of how we can design better systems by making protocols strategy-proof
so that the incentives for strategic or malicious behaviour are removed a priori.
The second is the economics of security generally, where there is convergence
with economists studying topics such as crime and warfare. The causes of insur-
gency, and tools for understanding and dealing with insurgent networks, are an
obvious attractor.
The third is the economics of dependability. Large system failures cost indus-
try billions, and the problems seem even more intractable in the public sector.
We need a better understanding of what sort of institutions can best evolve and
manage large complex interconnected systems.
Finally, the border between economics and psychology seems particularly
fruitful, both as a source of practical ideas for designing more usable secure
systems, and as a source of deeper insights into foundational issues.
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